By Andrew Field
The author is not here to defend Ken Flower or Derek Robinson, nor is there any interest in polishing reputations for sentimental reasons. What matters is clearing away a thicket of assumptions that, over the years, has fueled anger, anxiety, and genuine despair among many former Rhodesians. The issue involves less settled facts than a mythology assembled piecemeal; hearsay laid over inference, repeated until it hardened into something resembling truth. This is often espoused by those who believe they are ‘in the know’, but never were. Once such stories take root, they carry their own authority, even when the foundations are flimsy.
The tale itself is not new; it has circulated in different guises for decades. What remains troubling is the reflex to receive it emotionally rather than analytically. Many remain inclined to accept allegations of betrayal when voiced by people who were, by any honest measure, no friends of Rhodesia. That instinct is understandable after ‘defeat’: there is a human urge to personalise loss and to fix blame. But sentiment is a poor substitute for evidence. With time, the habit of suspicion has ossified into assumed truth, producing a mythology that resists scrutiny and crowds out a more sober account of how intelligence, liaison, and political collapse actually unfolded.
No tangible proof exists that Flower or Robinson were disloyal in the manner so often alleged. It would be desirable to have such proof, if only to settle the matter decisively. There were no Kilby-style defections, no clean bolt from the shadows to confirm a grand betrayal. What is possessed, instead, is inference layered upon hearsay, much of it sourced to figures whose hostility to the Rhodesian state was open and ideological. James MacManus was monitored precisely because of his antagonism towards the Rhodesian Front; David Owen, meanwhile, was Rhodesia’s principal political adversary as the war reached its endgame. Their retrospective pronouncements are not neutral dispatches; they are interpretations shaped by commitments made at the time.
MacManus’ Rhodesian tenure needs reading less as detached reportage and more as participation in a prevailing moral narrative. Based in Salisbury in the mid-to-late 1970s, he was regarded by the authorities not as a neutral observer but as a partisan journalist whose work tracked closely with British left‑liberal orthodoxy and was openly hostile to the Rhodesian Front. Special Branch’s European Desk monitored him, and he ultimately left the country when accreditation was withdrawn; a standard administrative lever used against journalists considered political actors in wartime. He later framed his exit as proof of repression, which neatly reinforced the worldview he already held. The surveillance, the departure, and the consistently partisan work suggest not a man uncovering hidden truths, but one interpreting events through a moral script already settled—and then reproducing it. It is convenient, of course, to quote a dead gay chum who cannot answer back.
Much confusion also stems from how intelligence actually functions. Senior officers, acting under government instruction, routinely maintain controlled liaison with hostile or semi‑hostile services, especially during negotiations and transitional periods. It’s the back door. These contacts are channels, not confessions, and usually at the highest equivalent levels. Not with some station chief in Lusaka. They exist to manage risk, signal intent, and prevent miscalculation. To recast liaison as treachery is to impose moral drama on what is, in reality, a bureaucratic and strategic necessity. A seasoned intelligence officer does not hand source names to a journalist; nor does a competent service expose sources to politicians if it hopes to retain credibility. The craft depends on discretion and compartmentation.
Most senior Special Branch officers interviewed over the years flatly deny or doubt that Flower was disloyal. One dissent stands out: Danny Stannard, who expressed lingering suspicion. But his remarks are presented as impressions, not evidence, unbacked by documents or corroboration. It’s not enough to say ‘he would have known’ – mostly a CID man, he only entered the top-level intelligence domain post 1980. Stannard himself was a controversial figure, frequently accused of chasing popularity in the charged post‑war moment. Repeating and amplifying suspicion conferred relevance for a while, but it did not last, largely because it was built on insinuation rather than proof.
There have been vague, hearsay inferences to suggest that Bureau of State Security chief, Hendrik van den Bergh, had ‘warned’ Prime Minister Ian Smith about Flower’s MI6 connections. It is not surprising that there was a parallel distrust of Flower within South African intelligence. Van den Bergh brooked no love for the British from the Boer War experience, like many Rhodesian kin betrayed. But the explanation offered is cultural rather than evidential: anything perceived as rooinek attracted instinctive suspicion. Even those who had severed formal ties with British structures, such as the disbanded Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, and embedded themselves in South African intelligence services, met unforeseen rooinek prejudice. In that climate, Flower, British-born and visibly associated with Rhodesian state security, remained suspect by Engels association alone. The distinction, however, is critical. Distrust is not insinuation, and suspicion is not accusation.
What is often overlooked in claims about Flower’s supposed ‘defection’ is that the real, documentable shifting of loyalties occurred elsewhere and in far greater numbers. As Rhodesia’s position collapsed, many security and military figures quietly transferred allegiance to South Africa, a state that had long presented itself as kin and protector while always the latent strategic threat to Rhodesia’s survival. These movements were pragmatic rather than ideological, driven by self-preservation as Pretoria recalibrated its regional interests. Numerous identifiable operatives who changed flags, sometimes pursuing private vendettas against the new order. Whatever judgement one makes they were overt acts of transition, grounded in political reality. Set against that record, the fixation on an unproven MI6 betrayal looks selective, even evasive, when far more tangible defections go largely unexamined.
There is, too, an older institutional dispute worth situating correctly: Flower versus BSA Police Commissioner, Basil Spurling. Spurling’s unpublished BSA Police history criticises Flower’s liaison with British intelligence during the formative years of the CIO. This was a pre‑UDI bureaucratic clash; rivalry and questions of primacy, not a charge of betrayal. Flower rebutted it in his memoir, and seen in context, it weakens rather than strengthens later accusations that try to stitch wartime treachery onto earlier administrative friction. This is very much, in the author’s opinion, the genesis of the myth.
If anyone holds tangible evidence that cannot reasonably be explained as an authorised service‑to‑service liaison, let it be shown. Let the exposure reveal how these men changed the course of history without impassioned assumption. Upon whom else should the finger fall? Those who accuse, the author can name a few? Emotional condemnation, speculation and enemy‑sourced gossip do not carry the weight some claim for them. These are the tools and narratives of Perfidious Albion. What the matter requires is debate without heat, more thorough research, and a disciplined assessment of the circumstantial record. Until such evidence appears, the situation rests on assertion, motive, and memory, and the uncomfortable recognition that, on this question, much remains opaque. The honest position is not to fill the silence with a story, but to admit that the matter may simply never be known. Alas, too many have taken their secrets to the grave.
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Andrew makes a vaild point. In the ‘Fighting Men of Rhodesia ep395/396, Professor Eric Louw’ shows that Vorster was willing to sell Rhodesians out to appease Kiisnger and the USA. According to Professor Louw, the USA wanted decolonisation, and the USA used decolonisation as a bargaining tool to enter WWII. Links to part 1 and 2.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYhL_rfV_KI&t=8s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xxs1yfNwmV0
A lot of people in SB and CIO didn’t like or respect both Flower and Stannard.
Perhaps personal opinion or feelings are best left to ones self , unless hard evidence exists.
I did my time incarcerated IN Zimbabwe, both on death row and as a common prisoner for nearly 20 years, and as you know, I was a senior officer in CIO and have my personal opinion on Dan, as did the South African security establishment, most of whom I worked with in South Africa, are now deceased, and who knows where their secret records are hidden.
And I was jailed for clearly political motivated offenses.
I agree that if people have opinions generated and backed up with official records, and if they have an axe to grind they should step forward. Else, Tula.
Additionally, they should not try to create a story by using flamboyant text.
Thats my opinion, and Ive read, Flowers book “SERVING SECRETLY”
Hi Kevin, read the released British Cabinet Papers for the period. There is no debate, Ken Flower was named as the source of British information. I don’t argue that Flower played both sides because he did. But that he was the informant on the inside is stipulated in the released Cabinet Papers.
SO WILL: That side of the long standing Question has finally been answered, BUT, what about the Others, who performed under-handed tricks and tactics, which were just as devastating for Our Beautiful land, as any damage that Ken Flower had inflicted upon us ?? Me being CURIOUS, that is the reason for this query…
Hi Andrew, I agree with your statement – “If anyone holds tangible evidence that cannot reasonably be explained as an authorised service‑to‑service liaison, let it be shown. Let the exposure reveal how these men changed the course of history without impassioned assumption. Upon whom else should the finger fall? Those who accuse, the author can name a few? Emotional condemnation, speculation and enemy‑sourced gossip do not carry the weight some claim for them. These are the tools and narratives of Perfidious Albion. What the matter requires is debate without heat, more thorough research, and a disciplined assessment of the circumstantial record.” We have had this discussion before and when I pointed to the released British Cabinet papers of the era, you simply ignored the conclusive evidence of Flower’s betrayals. I necessary I can will write an op-ed and again highlight the British Cabinet paper rekeases. The reason that Lord David Owen spoke so freely on BBC Radio 4 about Flower’s being their man on the inside in Salisbury is because the British Cabinet papers had been released. There is no doubt, the evidence is conclusive, Ken Flower was the British Government man on the inside.
This utter fiction. Ken Flower was not just a traitor (Professional spy for Mi6) in Rhodesia, he was in the early days of Mugabe’s premiership, a significant individual in intelligence. Andrew Field is deluded, as much as Smith’s cabinet was. Flower assisted in the defeat and deaths of many. Yet, retired in comfort. This article is a disgrace. Indeed, it does question why Ian Smith’s cabinet had Flower sit in for critical meetings. So many young men, white and black, gave up their lives to protect what they believed laudible and yet Ken Flower was not just working for “perfidious Albion” but was feeding the Stasi and KGB with highly sensitive, strategic intelligence. So many young men, and women lost their lives because of his mendacity.
You can access over 200 pages from Ken Flower which were top secret but which were obtained by myself from a source. If you read the secret cabinet papers of the British govt now declassified there is more there. Read David Owens own autobiography on my FB group page. Read the Thatcher papers, and former Pm Callaghan’s papers and the David Robinsons papers on my FB page. All I can do is marvel at how poorly informed some people are who make ridiculous comments about Flower, the CIO . Quite literally the top people in the CIO were all working for Queen and country and not for Rhodesia their pensions and kick backs being more important than loyalty to Rhodesia. Remember everyone made an oath of office to Rhodesia and working for another country was treasonous.
Hi Jeff (Waswe). As you rightly point out, see the released British Cabinet Papers for the period. THERE IS NO DEBATE, Ken Flower was named as the source of British information. The fact that Andrew Field does not mention this fact is perplexing. I suppose people will believe what they want to believe and that’s it.
Hi James, see the released British Cabinet Papers for the period. There is no debate, Ken Flower was named as the source of British information. The fact that Andrew Field does not mention that conclusive fact is perplexing. The question is why?
Interesting. Worth doing the required research to see who the moles were. Britain has always had a very active spy network.
Look forward to more on this.
Hi Cockburn DA. There is no debate, Ken Flower was named as the source in the released British Cabinet Papers of the period. The fact that Andrew Field does not mention this fact is perplexing.
The long and the short of it as usual is that Britain as it has done countless time before ,simply betrayed Rhodesia to follow its own agenda!! The blood of many hundreds of people both black and white lies squarely on the shoulders of the lying/cheating/manipulating Brits! Finished!!!!
You obviously havent read my book “The uncomfortable truth” nor have you accessed the Flower papers on the same name FB Group page, nor have you accessed the Robinson papers on the same FB address. Had you you would have along with reading Flowers own book been able to see the links to British Intelligence. A dive into the British Archives during the dates Flower was active would have shown the treatment he and Robinson got when visiting their bosses in the UK. There is even a letter from Thatcher to Flower thanking him for his service.
Rhodesia was sold out.
Read the below two books which are hard to put down.
A Handful of Hard Men by Hannes Wessels.
The Silent War by Reg Shay & Chris Vermaak. Hard to find. I got my copy out of USA.
When the Rhodesian Scouts attacked one terrorist camp and overran it they found New Zealand Anchor dairy products.
The question I have is were the goods shipped direct from New Zealand or Via England.
Then there is the murder of Stephen Mitford Goodson.
ANDREW: You have laid things out here, extremely clearly and there should now be no doubt where each character involved, personally stood. the FACT still remains that the country of RHODESIA, was stabbed in the back, often by persons unknown back then, or even now. PLUS, more than a few persons whom were thought to be Friends or Staunch Supporters. Whether or not WE will ever know These Names, or the REAL TRUTH, about this destruction of so Beautiful a Land, may remain a MYSTERY for many Moons, yet to come..
Hi Doug, There is no debate. Ken Flower was named as the British source in the released British Cabinet Papers. I have read them. Unless Andrew Field wants to argue that Lord David Owen and the many British Cabinet Papers were all manipulated for the sole purpose of framing Ken Flower then there can be NO DEBATE.
Isn’t it feasible that he played both sides of the coin with the full knowledge of the Rhodesia hierarchy – maybe at their behest? The same was probably true of the Brits who are, after all, masters of duplicity
Andrew, thank you for a educated, well presented article.
I have a comment waiting to be moderated. I hope Hannes will not spike it.
I worked for the Counter Intelligence Department of the CIO from January ,1982 to December 1990 when I was declared PNG and an enemy of the state by non other than current President.
I worked as Head of Desk for the USSR and DPRK.
The latter presented very real dangers for me as President Mugabe was a good friend of Kim Il Sung and DPRK enjoyed Most Favored Nation diplomatically.
Behind the scenes we worked every day on joint operations with the them Federal Republic of Germany. MI6, CIA, CSIS and AIS.
I worked with both Ken Flower and I briefed Director Internal (DIN) Danny Stannard and PM and later President Mugabe twice a week.
Robert Mugabe couldn’t quite ever wrap his head around how his best friend KIM would direct his diplomats in Zimbabwe to wreak the havoc they did. They led all diplomatic personnel in distribution of mandrax, counterfeit UD dollars and Pounds, rhino horn and ivory poaching, illegal gold mining, and the unadulterated coop ting of the civil service heirarchy and general level workforce.
Mugabe threatened me in front of Danny Stannard countless times, threatening to have me imprisoned incommunicado in Goromonzi if I continued to present the North Korean regime in a negative light.
Andrew, so little is known about how intelligence fits into geopolitics that I have given up trying to defend myself for staying on after things turned south.
I am proud to have served our country at that time and in the way I did. Believe me, without the presence of patriotic white officers, and myself of Irish, v Manyika and Indian descent, white Zimbabweans were going to be targeted for Goromonzi at an alarming rate.
Case in point. A farmer in Beatrice had named his dog Mugabe. An officer was instructed to go to the farm and arrest the farmer and shoot the dog. I managed to diffuse the situation by having the farmer write a letter of apology and changing the name of the dog.
Also, one of my closest friends, mentors, and Head of Counter Intelligence Michael George Crafter we’re once directed by Mugabe in a weekly briefing to make sure we became card carrying members of ZANUn(PF) or leave the service. If anyone remembers Mike Crafter he will know that he brooked no nonsense from anyone and advised Mugabe while smoking on an aromatic pipe that we would not be able to effectively and honestly discharge our duties as intelligence officers if we did. Stannard opened his mouth to diffuse the situation, but before he could speak, Mugabe said ” That is the answer I wanted to hear Mr Crafter. I look forward to working with you for many more years
Lets start by getting the files on John Giles un redacted through the freedom of information act. Those that knew him swear he would never have committed suicide !! There are other serious anomalies that need clearing up, but you can never trust spooks, especially gay ones.
Hi Mswati, 7084, greetings from 7432. Ex SAS Lieutenant Andre Scheepers was tasked by RSA Intelligence to ‘dispatch’ the MI5 officers who had murdered John Giles in London. His story is on record and Andre is not a fantasist. On mission he was betrayed and arrested. I will add that Ken Flower was himself considered for elimination. Unless it comes from verifiable sources then I take ex Rhodesian SB bloviation with a pinch of salt.
Thanks for this well written and informative piece Andy.
Andrew I understand the gist of your, as always, superbly written argument but … really, apart from his ideological, emotional disdain of the Rhodesian cause, why would David Owen publicly out Ken Flower, as he did? That it is highly conceivable that someone was leaking secrets and that Flower was perfectly placed, is not ‘evidence’ per se; but this random outing – it is more likely Owen’s motive was to very specifically shed light, even brag, than put out fake news. I for one find this evidence of treachery compelling.
I agree John. The way Owen said it, I can’t think why he would have been lying? And the same with this recent revelation in MacManus’s article; I can’t imagine why that information might have been contrived?