White Farmer Conundrum

By Andrew Field

Zimbabwe’s government announced its first remittances under the Global Compensation Agreement (GCA) in April 2025, disbursing US $3 million to dispossessed farmers, representing 1% of the total US $311 million allocated for the first batch of 378 farms. The response to this has been mixed. It has been 25 years since the land grabs, with its violent and flawed implementation, that led to the disruption of agriculture and massive economic decline.

In 2019, the Zimbabwean government declared an initiative to compensate commercial farmers for land seized during the controversial land reform programme. The agreement was formalised in July 2020, pledging US$3.5 billion to approximately 4,000 white farmers for infrastructure and improvements but excluding land value.

The new, post-coup d’état regime under President Emmerson Mnangagwa had hoped to facilitate economic recovery and mend international relations, particularly with Western nations that imposed sanctions following the land seizures. Sanctions were targeted and imposed for much broader reasons, but one has to play to the gullible and blinkered in politics.

The government had been eager to restore investor confidence and access global financial systems, which was crucial for addressing Zimbabwe’s substantial foreign debt. Furthermore, the agreement aligned with 2013 constitutional obligations mandating recompense for improvements on seized farms.

Zimbabwe’s land invasions, initiated by Robert Mugabe‘s administration, commenced in February 2000 as part of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), ostensibly seeking to address historical land ownership imbalances dating back to the colonial era. Several factors triggered the unfortunate events that followed.

The British-brokered Lancaster House Agreement imposed a ten-year moratorium on land reform other than through the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model, and this had elapsed. The British Tony Blair government had distanced itself from its postcolonial obligations, then reneged on a commitment to partially fund land acquisition.

But there was political opportunism in the land grab for Mugabe, whose popularity was waning following the loss of the 2000 constitutional referendum, which had clauses enabling compulsory land acquisition without compensation. Farmers at the time were perceived as being deeply entrenched with and funding the opposition, which defeated Mugabe in the referendum. He exploited this as a cause for the militant land invasions that quickly followed.

The reality was that it became uniquely anti-white racialism that would strike at the heart of the opposition. It became an opportune, systematic programme of political patronage gifting while forcibly occupying white-owned farms without compensation. No consideration was given to the fundamental human rights of farmers, their families, and black farm labourers who had also been evicted from their homes.

The government enacted legal measures to facilitate land seizures, including the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act and amendments to the Land Acquisition Act. These laws protected occupiers and transferred ownership of seized lands to the state. By October 2001, nearly 2,000 farms were occupied by over 100,000 individuals.

The scale was substantial, with approximately 4 million hectares of commercial farmland acquired by 2018. The process was marred by violence, with reports of at least seven white farmers and numerous black farm workers killed by 2002. Somehow, opinion favoured this seemingly criminal dispossession and abuse of property rights; not to mention fundamental civil liberties. Mugabe achieved a popularity coup!

Because the black farm workers’ plight was severely underreported, there are no finite or universally accepted statistics of their displacement; the reportage of the day is focused on white farmers’ losses. Upwards of 1.5 million plus (some say more) black farm workers and their families were affected, with some reports indicating up to 300,000 farm workers losing not only their jobs but their homes too.

They were excluded from land redistribution, punitively so, being disallowed plots on the land they were evicted from, leaving them unemployed and homeless. Effectively, having worked for the white man, they were politically marginalised. Many actually turned against their employers, hopeful of exploiting the situation. Most fell short.

The economic consequences were severe. Agricultural production plummeted, with tobacco output, the prime cash export, falling to 21% of 2000 levels by 2008. Inflation soared, reaching 103.8% by November 2001, and the Zimbabwean dollar became practically worthless by 2010. Food shortages affected hundreds of thousands, with 45% of the population reportedly malnourished by 2008. Zimbabwe has meandered through eight currency changes since land reform!

Before 2000, Zimbabwe was renowned as the ‘breadbasket of Africa’, with a highly productive agricultural sector dominated by large-scale commercial farms. These predominantly white-owned farms contributed almost entirely to the country’s exports, accounting for 40-45% of total exports in most years. Agriculture ministry data shows that in the 1990s, Zimbabwe maintained a surplus agricultural trade balance in six out of eight years from 1992 to 2000. However, by 2005, food exports had plummeted to about $200 million, while imports rose to approximately $400 million, signalling a negative trade balance.

Government’s agricultural services were not geared to support the new land occupiers. The shift from net exporter to net importer status precipitated economic turmoil. While it may have been celebrated as a great revolutionary victory by the party faithful, in economic terms, the land grab had failed. The transformation and recovery have not been without challenges and controversies. Government-led ‘command agriculture’ programmes aimed at recovery never helped. They were marred by gross inefficiency and corruption allegations.

Despite the overall decline in agriculture, certain sectors have demonstrated resilience and growth, but it took many years to recover, and that recovery was isolated. The tobacco sector, a generally good benchmark, initially disrupted, has rebounded impressively. Production increased from a low of 48.7 million kg in 2008 to 296 million kg in 2023/4 season, with an average price of US$3.50/kg, as reported by the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board.

The tobacco sector’s recovery was facilitated mostly by contract farming, with 86% of tobacco produced under contract by 2018. Industry p roducers now includeover 90,000 smallholder farmers and is a major export earner, with 200 million kg exported in 2020 valued at over US$780 million. This is a success worthy of highlighting, but it should never have been at an economic nor humanitarian cost to the nation.

The horticulture sector, while initially ravaged by land seizures, is showing signs of recovery. Current annual exports stand at $120 million, including citrus, flowers, tea, avocados, blueberries, and macadamia nuts.

Land allocated through two primary models: A1 schemes for smallholder farmers allocated small plots of 5-10 hectares to an estimated 150,000 to 180,000 households, securing the ruling party’s rural vote; and A2 schemes for new black commercial farmers allocated larger farms averaging around 125 hectares to approximately 20,000 to 45,000 households, often enabling patronage. The A2 schemes, with fewer benefiting households, accounted for a significant portion of the redistributed land.

Now here is where it gets a little more complicated and obfuscated. Evidence indicates that the allocation process was heavily influenced by Mugabe’s propensity for dishing out patronage and, no surprise, corruption, that had erupted in elite circles and undermined nationalist goals. Reports suggest that a tiny clique of high-ranking politicians and officials, including cabinet ministers, received multiple farms.

Voluntary organisations have documented that by 2005, senior government officials, military men, even judges and party faithful business leaders, and their relatives had received more than one million hectares, approximately 14% of the total redistributed land. One organisation estimated that about 2% of new landowners controlled roughly one-third of the redistributed land, underscoring the imbalance in allocation.

Another reason agricultural recovery was impeded was that new landlord elites, sitting in the corridors of power, security and administration, thought they could farm by mobile phone from the luxury of their Harare homes and offices. The poor were clearly doomed to get poorer and hungrier to boot.

Ordinary Zimbabweans, the supposedly intended primary beneficiaries, at best, often received smaller, less productive A1 plots, if anything at all. The vast majority of the population, who had expressed their gullible joy with the land reform programme, received none. A 2015 survey found that 65% of Zimbabweans believed land reform primarily benefited the ruling elite, with only 20% saying it helped ordinary people. Women and youth were particularly marginalised, with a 2016 study finding that only 12% of land beneficiaries were women, and less than 10% were youth under 35 years of age.

The lack of a comprehensive land audit has sustained the murkiness of the allocation process. Attempts at audits in 2003, 2018, and 2020 were incomplete or suppressed, reportedly due to resistance from powerful beneficiaries. This resistance has made precise statistics elusive, but the pattern of patronage and elite enrichment is well-documented in studies and public sentiment.

The primary funding mechanism of the GCA is the issuance of long-term, US dollar-denominated treasury bonds. This approach is evidenced in the recent disbursement. The bonds, reportedly with a 10-year maturity, represent a significant portion of the government’s strategy to meet its compensation obligations over an extended period. If you don’t have the money, print it.

This method allows Zimbabwe to spread the financial burden over time, potentially mitigating immediate fiscal pressures. A treasury bond needs the trust of its holder, should be transferable, and the market should be sufficiently fungible to trade the bond to function correctly. The bonds are transferable, but not underwritten, with a low coupon rate of 2% (compared to say US market bonds at 3.5%), so would pension funds and other market players pick up the tab?

Those booted off the land 25 years back are aging and may not survive the 10-year maturity. Zimbabwe’s fiscus is not renowned for issues of trust. Farmers will remember the November 2016 bond note issue at 1:1 against the dollar; many of them are old enough to remember the now worthless Rhodesia Defence Bond.

Supplementing the bond issuance, the government has allocated funds from the national budget for direct cash payments. This is particularly relevant for foreign farmers and initial disbursements. The government earmarked $20 million from both the 2024 and 2025 budgets for payments to foreign farmers. This demonstrates a commitment to meeting some obligations through immediate fiscal resources, albeit on a smaller scale compared to the bond-based approach.

The Zimbabwean government has also signalled its intention to seek international donor support to assist with the compensation process, but that is falling on deaf ears. This strategy is twofold: to secure additional funding sources; and to mend relations with Western countries, which have been strained since the land reforms. Farmers are not holding their breath and Western countries are reeling over recently promulgated NGO laws, thus pulling back on funding.

Furthermore, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has proposed financial instruments to expedite the compensation process. Zimbabwe’s complex economic history and ongoing debt issues have promoted scepticism. While, as usual, specific details are not available, these proposals aim to leverage capital markets without adding to Zimbabwe’s debt burden. Really?

Reactions among white farmers and farm organisations to this compensation scheme are mixed. Many are hard up and out of employment and have express gratitude for the interim payments, viewing them as better than a ‘kick in the pants’ and helpful for immediate living needs. However, most remain sceptical about the government’s ability to fulfil the entire compensation package and certainly question the value of treasury bonds in a most unstable fiscal environment.

It is noteworthy that many farmers have not yet signed up for the compensation scheme, choosing instead to hold onto their title deeds. About 1,300 had signed up. This reluctance indicates persistent uncertainty about the process and highlights the complex nature of land ownership and rights in Zimbabwe’s post-colonial context. With the greatest of respect, their land shall never be returned to them, those title deeds have no value, “never in a thousand years” to quote a not-so-recent Prime Minister.

The compensation issue has fired up broader debate. The pro-indigenous stance is vehemently opposed to compensation of white farmers, often citing the party faithful line and clearly in the revisionist historical context of land occupation, deemed theft, through colonisation. This standpoint underscores the tension between addressing perceived historical injustices and current economic realities. The land revolution is being smudged. Some suggest the money be better spent on hospitals and schools.

Furthermore, it throws into the ring just another axe to grind by emerging factions presently opposed to Mnangagwa’s governance; and definately heightens risk for recipients of the bonds. Farmers, or their survivors, in possession of treasury bonds may find that they have been duped when the bonds are not honoured by new, perhaps more antagonist regimes. Much like the Rhodesian Defence Bonds, which the Mugabe regime refused to honour.

For war veterans, who led the attacks against white farmers, it gets worse. The Zimbabwean weekly, The Standard, reports that the government has “introduced a US$500 per hectare land title levy on resettled farmers, sparking significant backlash from war veterans and critics”. The levy is perceived by some as a mechanism to fund compensation for displaced white farmers; an acute anathema for liberation cohorts. War veteran beneficiaries of land fear the levy could lead to losing their land.

Oddly, absolutely nobody seems to be batting for the millions of black victims of the purge who lost their well-being and homes during the brutal evictions. Not that treasury bonds are exactly edible or place a roof over one’s head.

Clearly, evicted white farmers who suffered the injustices of property dispossession need to make Hobson’s choice between holding onto their now worthless title deeds or succumbing to a seemingly precarious scheme of arrangement, which is not without its risk of being reduced to the same value as their title deeds. Essentially, nobody is coming to their rescue, and it may be a case of grabbing the bonds and money and hoping for the best. Those that do best liquidate quickly, if they can, and walk away from this sordid historical event.

It seems mind-boggling that South Africa is cumbersomely waddling towards the temptation of a racist land grab, and one hopes they are learning lessons from the Zimbabwean land reform pogrom. Sadly, with prevailing and venomous race hatred; political parties with waning support being driven to radicalism and desperate for popular approval; such a gullible electorate; and the great isolation of the state in Western circles; the popularity stakes are not looking good for white farmers.

Read Andrews article on his site – https://justandrewinzimbabwe.wordpress.com/2025/04/13/white-farmer-conundrum/

Visit Andrews blog – https://justandrewinzimbabwe.wordpress.com